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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
WESLEY WAYNE AUSTIN, 
Defenant/Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF 
Wesley Wayne Austin, Appellant, prose on appeal, replys to the respondent's 
based on findings of fact and conclusions of law, fully settled. Respondent is 
relying on his "rephrasing'of the issues to mislead this Court with misdirection 
and concealment. Respndent has not responded to the issues presented in the instant 
case. 
ISSUE ONE: 
Respondent wants to play word games with the transcript and the Judgment and 
Conviviction Order dated April 16, 2001. Respondent claims that spoken words prev-
ail over the written words in the Judgment and Conviction Order. The respondent 
uses Rule 36 to support his agument, but conceals the statute that prevails over 
the rule. Idaho Code 19-2513 states in pertinent part; "the Court shall set forth 
in its judgment and sentence the minimum period of confinement and the subsquent 
· d t · t ·oo " 1n e erm1na e per1 .•. In the sentencing transcripts of April 16, 2001 Judge 
Shindurling ambiguously states twice; "As to Count XXI you will serve a minimum of 
and a maximum of three years." There is no specfic indeterminate amount stated in 
the trascript as is mandatory by the language of 19-2513. The Court then goes on 
eight times stating;" A~ to Count XXIV, a minimum of two and a maximum of three 
years." Now the Court does not state a specfic minimum period of incarceration. 
Respectfully the appellant asks "two what?" Tue days, two weeks, two months? What? 
Now we have played the word games of the respondent. It is quite clear from the 
transcripts that the voice words are ambiguous, thus making the sentence illegal. 
An illegal sentence must be corrected and in the presence of the defendant, pursuant 
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to Idaho Code 19-2503 and Idaho Criminal Rule 43(a). The law has been well settled 
by this Court with the rulings in State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, (1983), Lopez v. 
State, 108 Idaho 394, and in State v. Money, 109 Idaho 757 (1985). We read in Money 
(supra) "It is entirely irrelevant that Money's presence might have had little eff-
ect on the outcome." This clearly set forths the inent of this Court that the def-
endant must be afforded all of his Due Process rights. In the interest of justice 
and not some word games, the appellant must be resentenced and be present at those 
proceedings. 
Further evidence that the appellant has an illegal sentence, is Judge Shindurl-
ings declaration in the Rule 35 hearing of June 20, 2014, (See Rule 35 hearing Tran-
cripts, pages 16 and 17) where we read; "The sentence that was voiced in the original 
Judgment in April had the two to five sentence on each count, which was an illegal 
sentence under the charges that were brought." Judge Shindurling goes on to say; 
that he corrected the illegal sentence sua sponte with out motion to trigger the 
correction, on October 19, 2001. This brings issue as to the accuracy of the tran-
scripts and why the appellant was denied acces to the transcripts when his due dili-
gence started. After all this case is full of attorneys not reporting illegal 
exparte hearings, elected officials polical influence in this sentence, and the 
distruction of exhibits in 2008, with District Court approval, just to name a few 
of the infractions surrounding this case. All of which the respondent did not 
respond. (See sentencing transcripts page 10, Lines 20 thru 25) This is yet another 
indication of the evidence that the sentence was to follow the plea agreement and 
the illegal ex parte communication with not only an elected official, but an alledg-
ed victim. Idaho Rules of Professinal Conduct are very clear on reporting judicial 
misconduct by other attorneys. ( I.R.P.C. 8.3) Respondent has failed to respond 
to this issue. 
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ISSUE TWO: WAS 1HE PLEA AGREEMENT MADE WI1H 1HE DEFENDANT BINDING UPON 1HE PARTIES? 
Respondent failed to respond to the crux of this appeal. If it was not binding 
upon the parties then the agreement has been breached. Reasonable minds without 
playing word games, would come to the same conclusion as Mr. Hendricks, assistant 
prosecutor for Bingham County at the Rule 35 hearing stated in reference to the 
plea agreement;" Looking at it it looks like there was a binding one and I too have 
looked at the transcripts." (See Rule 35 hearing page 23, Lines 5,6, and 7) Even if 
by some strange way of analysis of fact and law, that it was not binding upon the 
District Court, it was sure binding upon the prosecution and the State of Idaho. 
The United States Supreme Court in Puckett v. United States, 566 U.S. 129 (2009) 
referenced L Ed Digest 59, 60.5,where we~_read; _ . "'- -·= ::. 
"Plea bargains are essentially contracts. When the consideration for a contract 
fails-that is, when one of the exchanged promises is not kept-the court does not say 
that the voluntary bilateral consent to the contract was broken. The party injured 
by the breach will generally be entitled to some remedy, which might include the 
right to rescind the contract entirely; but that is not the same thing as saying the 
contract was never validly concluded. When a defendant agrees to a plea bargain, 
the government takes on certain obligations. If those obligations are not met, the 
defendant is entitled to seek a remedy, which might in some cases be rescission of 
the agreement, allowing him to take back the consideration he has furnished, that 
is, to withdraw his plea. But rescission is not the only possible remedy; in 
Santobello, the United States Supreme Court allowed for a resentencing at which the 
government would fully comply with the agreement-in effect, specific performance of 
the contract. In any case, it is entirely clear that a breach does not cause the 
guilty plea, when entered, to have been unknowing or involuntary. It is precisely 
because the plea was knowing and voluntary (and hence valid) that the government 
· is obligated to uphold its side of the bargain. (Scalia, J., joined by Roberts, 
Ch. J., and Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburt, Breyer and Alita, JJ." 
Santobello v New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), is very clear. "THat when a 
guilty plea rested in significant degree on a promise of the prosecutor, so that 
it could be said to be part of the inducement, such promise must be fulfilled, and 
that the state court!s affirrnance of the conviction was improperin the case at bar, 
it being irrmaterial that the breach of agreement by the prosecution was inadvertent, 
and (2) in expressing the view of four of the seven members of the court, that the 
case should be remanded to the state court to decide whether the circumstances of 
the agreement on the plea, with the defendant being resentenced before a different 
judge, or whether the relief sought by the defendant as to withdrawing his guilty 
plea should be granted. 
- 3 -
The respondant in the instant case wants this court to review the plea colloquy 
to see if the plea was given voluntarily and willingly. This procedure under Rule 
11 binds the parties to the plea agreement, pursuant to the historic rulings of 
Santobello (supra) and Puckett (supra). So when Judge Shindurling deletes words in 
the plea agreement. (See change of plea transcripts page 9 Lines 21-25, page 10 
lines 1 and 2) While explaining to the appellant he leaves out reference to binding 
on the court and Rule 11(d)(1)(D) f~~thering his violation of oath of office. This 
was done to structure a sentence to satisfy the people that put tremendous pressure 
on Judge Shindurling through political influence and corruption. However appellant 
concedes his plea was willing and voluntary and he fully understood the agreemeni, 
as it was written and explained by defense counsel. The language was plain, clear 
and without ambiguity. Paragraphs 1 and 12 of the plea agreement are very clear 
and the appellant in open court says he understands the agreement. However the 
Judge mistates the agreement many times as it is clear from the record to structure 
a sentence influenced by elected officials. This made the plea agreement binding 
on the Court as well as the state and appellant. Yet to date the only one com-
pelled to abide by the plea agreement has been the appellant. Even if by some 
strange definition that the court was not bound, the State of Idaho is. The 
breach of the plea agreement by the State started in the plea colloquy when they 
remained silent. The State furthered its berach by remaining silent at sentencing. 
Which leads one to believe that more ex parte meetings and communications were 
held. The time of the breach of plea agreement is the time the agreement becomes 
void. The State's inducement and promise to the appellant in exchange for his 
guilty plea was to run the sentences concurrent.as stated twice in paragraphs 1 
and 12 in the plea agreement. 
Additionally the Court did not accept the plea agreement as written.and the 
Court must give the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his plea. It is clear 
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from the record that did not happen. 
The State as well as the Court breached the Plea Agreement from its inception 
and constitutes an illegal sentence. 
This case has not been the garden variety litigation. One question that will 
arrise is "Why did the Defendant/Appellant take so long to contest his sentence?" 
The asnswer is given to all concerned in Defense Counsel Parmenter's letter to the 
Prosecuting Attorney Scott Andrew. (See attached exhibit 1) Mr. Parmenter knew 
and understood what the agreement was and what the Appellant understood. 
Appellant is not able to obtain copies of his Presentence Reports of his 
federal convictions. However both state in the Criminal History portion, 3 year 
suspended sentence.for the State of Idaho. This information was requested by U.S. 
Probation and Parole. The request was directed at the District Court. 
REMEDY REQUESTED 
Appellant respectfully requests specific performance of his plea agreement of 
2001. It has been 4 years since the warrant for the alledged probation violation. 
The State of Idaho, Bingham County and the District Court have abused their power 
of authority by not having a probation revocation hearing in a reasonable time. 
Appellant has had two other hearings via telephone, Why not a probation revocation 
hearing? 
Appellant has never asked for anything but what he agreed in his Plea of Guilty. 
The State can play word games, in which they fail due to their not reading the 
Statute 19-2513 that overrules the Rule 36. 
Specifically Appellant requests the following remedy: 
1. Remand this proceeding back to the District Court to correct the illegal 
sentence with Appellant present. 
2. Instruct the District Court to sentence Appellant pursuant to the 
Appellant's written Plea Agreement, which is pleading guilty to 10 counts 
of violation of 18-3106 with a maximum sentence of 3 years with all 
counts to run concurrently. 
3. Suspend the sentence and place Appellant on 3 years of probation pursuant 
to 20-222. 
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4. Probation to terminate April 16, 2004. 
5. All warrants, detainers,,~olds, etc. must be quashed with prejudice 
immediately. 
CONCLUSION 
In the interest of Justice, Appellant respectfully requests his Appeal and 
Remedy be granted. 
Respectfully sutmitted, 
Wesley Wayne Austin 
Pro-Se on Appeal. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 21 day of August, 2014, the foregoing reply 
brief was entered in a true and coreect copy served upon the parties listed below. 
Attorney General 
PO Box 0010 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
David N. Parmenter, Esq 
Nathan D. Rivera, Esq. 
Telephone 
(208) 785-5618 
August 31, 2011 
Scott Andrew 
Prosecuting Attorney 
501 N. Maple 
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221 
RE: State v. Austin 
Our File No.: 00-194 
Dear Scott: 
David N. Parmenter & Associates 
Attorneys at Law 
53 S. Shilling 
P.O. Box 700 
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221 
I wanted to give you a brief update on Wes Austin. 
FAX (208) 785-4858 
E-MAIL parlaw@gmail.com 
First, his plea agreement since your office was very specific, had him pleading to 10 counts of check 
fraud, with each count carrying a maximum penalty of three years in prison. The agreement, which 
was an 11 ( c )( 1 )( C) which is binding on the court, and provided that each of the counts were to run 
concurrently to be suspended. On the day of sentencing, the court ordered that those sentences run 
consecutively, and we filed an appeal. As a result of the appeal, the judgment order was later 
amended to read that the sentences would run concurrently and not consecutively. 
Mr. Austin therefore has a maximum term of three years he served, not 10 years as you may have 
otherwise thought. You can check the file to see whether I am correct, but I believe that I am. 
He also should have credit for 155 days spent in Bingham County, as well as approximately 14 
months in South Dakota after the detainer for the probation violation. 
Mr. Austin has no difficulty with pleading and working out an agreement as long as it is concurrent 
with his federal time. If he has to come back to Idaho, the most that can be imposed is 36 months 
minus time served. Further, he will use his IAD, which means that the State ofldaho must dispose 
of the matter in six months or less. 
Further, you should be aware that he was recently sentenced in a criminal case in Federal Court in 
South Dakota. He received a sentence of 132 months, or 11 years. As you can see from the enclosed 
order, he has been ordered to pay restitution of $848,909.48. 
Scott Andrew 
August 31, 2011 
With present budget cuts and constraints, I am not sure that the State ofldaho would be best served 
by bringing him back. The State ofldaho has already received more restitution in this case than they 
have probably received in any cases on a pro rata basis for the amount owed, and Mr. Austin had 
been willing to pay a substantial portion of the debt-which ultimately was not paid over to your 
office, because of a handful of the creditors who were unwilling to negotiate. 
Please advise and let me know if you really want to pursue the interstate remedies. 
Very truly yours, 
David N. Parmenter 
Jg 
cc: Wes Austin 
